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Abstract
We determine the core characteristics of a climate coalition’s optimal policies in a dynamic twocountry directed technical change framework. Unilateral policies alter the structure of production and
thereby innovation incentives across countries. Whenever feasible, optimal policies implement sustainable growth by directing global innovation to the nonpolluting sector. If nonparticipants drive global
innovation, this requires policies relocating clean production to nonparticipants. A calibration exercise
suggests that the US or EU alone are too small to implement sustainable growth. A coalition of Annex
I countries that signed the Kyoto protocol can implement sustainable growth, yet required tax rates are
very high.
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Introduction

In June 1992, at the Earth Summit in Rio, the UNFCCC was opened for signature. The objective of the
convention was to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UN, 1992). Twenty-two years since,
increased scientific evidence for climate change further strengthened the call to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. The outcomes of climate negotiations since Rio have been disappointing however. Where UNFCCC membership is near universal, the Kyoto protocol, which is the most important agreement linked
to the UNFCCC, has never been ratified by the US. In addition, Japan, New Zealand, Russia and Canada
have not taken on any second round targets under the protocol. Subsequent rounds of negotiations, from
Bali to Prague, were unsuccessful in establishing a universal treaty with binding limits on emissions. As a
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consequence, attention has shifted to ’incomplete agreements’ and policy actions adopted by a more limited
number of countries. Examples are the European Emission Trading System, launched in 2005 and operational in 28 countries, but also individual countries’ and states’ actions such as Germany’s Energiewende
and California’s Global Warming Solutions Act.
A global climate agreement is however still viewed as preferable to such unilateral policies. The main
reason is that unilateral policies cause carbon leakage. Carbon leakage is the increase in emissions in
nonparticipatory countries, as a consequence of emission-reducing policies in participatory countries. For
example, a restriction of carbon intensive good production will increase the global price of these goods,
which in turn increases production of these goods in nonparticipatory countries. Carbon leakage reduces
the effectiveness, and thereby increases the cost, of unilateral policies in reducing emissions vis-à-vis the
global solution (Babiker, 2005; Burniaux and Martins, 2012).1
Unilateral policies also affect nonparticipant’s future emissions through technical change. By altering
the structure of production across countries, unilateral policies affect innovation decisions in nonparticipatory countries. More specifically, policies that increase the price of carbon intensive goods encourage
production and thereby innovation in these goods in these countries. Unless ‘clean’ sector innovation in
the participatory countries is sufficiently strong, global innovation will be directed at the ‘dirty’ sector,
increasing future emissions.
In this paper, we assess the conditions under which unilateral policies lead to sustainable growth globally, in the sense of curbing future emission growth, especially in foreign countries not adhering to climate
policies. For foreign countries to substitute away from dirty goods, the clean good must be a sufficiently
strong substitute, and sufficiently advanced relative to the dirty good. Sustainable growth thus requires
inducing clean innovation. If the participatory countries dominate global innovation, i.e. if these countries are more innovative than non-participatory countries, clean growth is straighforwardly implemented
through domestic innovation subsidies. If instead, the direction of global growth is determined in the nonpaticipatory countries, sustainable growth require policies that, in the short run, increase the world market
price of the clean good relative to the dirty good, turning the foreign countries in clean exporters, and encouraging clean innovation in these countries. Whether the participatory countries can sufficiently steer
global innovation depends on the initial productivity of clean and dirty technologies, and the relative size of
the coalition in terms of output. A large coalition with more advanced clean technology is more likely able
to unilaterally implement sustainable growth.
The policy advice to stimulate foreign clean innovation runs counter to the intuitive advice based on
the static perspective. The static view seeks the most (welfare) cost-effective solution to reduce emissions,
given the state of technology, and will always opt for domestic emission reductions increasing the competitiveness of the foreign dirty sector. With foreign innovations driving global growth, such policies will
reduce current emissions, but, by encouraging dirty innovation in foreign, fail to prevent emission growth
and never implement sustainable growth.
Calibrating our stylized model, we find that the US or EU alone are too small to unilaterally direct flobal
innovation efforts towards sustainable growth. Even though a coalition of Annex B countries with binding
1 See also Markusen (1975), Hoel (1996), Copeland and Taylor (2004), Levinson and Taylor (2008) and van der Werf and Di Maria
(2012).

2

targets does not drive global innovation, it is sizable enough to redirect innovation outside this coalition and
thereby global long-run growth to the clean sector. The calibrated tax rates required in such a case however
are very high: the tax rate on dirty intermediate input use exceeds 100%, corresponding to approximately
1700 $/tCO2. Larger coalitions require lower taxes to implement sustainable growth.
Our formal model builds on the Acemoglu et al. (2012) two-sector framework of directed technical
change in the presence of an environmental externality. In this framework, final goods are produced using two intermediates. The production of the dirty intermediate causes carbon emissions, which reduce
future utility. Scientists innovate in the sector with the greatest expected return. We extend the framework
with a second country, allow for free trade in intermediate goods, assume no international enforcement of
patent rights, and full and immediate international technology spillovers. These assumptions are strong, yet
provide us with a clear setup to point at the core mechanisms.
The result that implementing sustainable growth may require increasing the price of the clean intermediate in the short run follows from directed technical change, the presence of carbon leakage and the
importance of locality in innovation decisions. The result resembles the finding in Acemoglu (1998, 2002),
who shows that profit-motivating scientists have an incentive to develop technologies for goods that are
(relatively) expensive, in high demand, and technologically advanced. Acemoglu (1998) also pointed at
the important role of international property rights protection, determining the market scientists face. Our
framework combines an environmental and innovation market failure; firms do not appropriate the full social return of their innovations. Jaffe et al. (2005) argue that in this context, optimal policies comprise both
a tax on pollution, and an innovation subsidy. This subsidy should redirect scientists to where their social
value is greatest. Using formal modeling, Gerlagh et al. (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) confirm this
insight and show that with directed technical change a temporary subsidy redirecting scientists to the clean
sector may be sufficient to prevent emissions from accumulating to dangerous levels.2
Empirical evidence for directed technical change is presented by Newell et al. (1999), who provide evidence for a positive responsive of energy-efficiency improvements to energy prices, and Popp (2002) and
Aghion et al. (2012), who, using patent data, confirm that high energy prices and a large stock of existing
knowledge of clean technologies spur the development of such technologies.3 As noted above, in a static
framework, the unilateral implementation of a carbon tax may cause carbon leakage. Directed technical
change will then affect the degree of carbon leakage in the long run (Golombek and Hoel, 2004; Gerlagh
and Kuik, 2007; Di Maria and Smulders, 2005; Di Maria and van der Werf, 2008; Hemous, 2012). In determining optimal unilateral environmental policies, this effect should be taken into account. Apart from
Hemous (2012), the literature had so far not recognized that such optimal policies may require the nonparticipatory country to become a clean good exporter. The different outcomes reflect different basic of
assumptions. Golombek and Hoel (2004) assume R&D to be always pollution-saving and Di Maria and
Smulders (2005) abstract from foreign innovation. Gerlagh and Kuik (2007) and Di Maria and van der
Werf (2008) posit that patents are perfectly enforced internationally which implies that innovation becomes
independent of industry location. Hemous (2012) adopts a two-country framework with directed technical
2 Aghion

and Howitt (2009) reached the same conclusion in a similar, yet simplified analysis.
Acemoglu and Linn (2004) and Hanlon (2011) find evidence for directed technical change in the pharmaceutical sector and
the cotton textile industry in 19th century Britain, respectively.
3 Also
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change closely related to the framework presented in this paper. The countries trade in polluting and nonpolluting goods, where the former is produced using a combination of ’clean’ and ’dirty’ inputs. To redirect
the world economy to a sustainable growth trajectory, innovation in this dirty input must be halted.
Important contrasts between Hemous (2012) and this paper remain however. Hemous (2012) takes
countries as equally innovative and abstracts from international technology spillovers in his core framework.
We assume positive technology spillovers and allow for asymmetries in the size of the labor force and the
number of scientists across countries. By abstracting from asymmetries in countries’ innovation potential
and labor force, Hemous (2012) cannot consider the role that these parameters play as core determinants of
both the optimal policy set and the ability to unilaterally redirect the global economy to a more sustainable
growth trajectory. Lastly, we contribute to the literature by explicitly contrasting optimal policy under
exogenous and endogenous technical change.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and Section 3 solves for its equilibrium.
Section 4 discusses optimal unilateral policies, and under what conditions a sustainable growth path can
be unilaterally implemented. Section 5 includes a calibration of the model and several numerical results.
Section 6 discusses alternative modeling assumptions and Section 7 concludes. Several proofs are presented
in Appendix A.

2

The model

This section introduces the basic framework. We extend the Acemoglu et al. (2012) framework to two
countries, where the countries home, h, and foreign, f , can equally be regarded as internally coordinating
regions. Each country k ∈ {h, f } is endowed with a fixed amount of effective labor Lk , which is an increasing function of the population size of the country. Similarly, the inelastic supply of effective scientists, sk ,
increases in the number of researchers in country k. This setup allows for a flexible interpretation when
calibrating the model. Throughout the paper we refer to Lk as labor and sk as the number of scientists in
country k.
Preferences and production

In each country, a representative household at time t maximizes intertem-

poral utility
(1)

Ukt = u (ckt+ , Et+ )

where ckt+ = {ckt , ckt+1 ..., ck∞ } and Et+ = {Et , Et+1 , ..., E∞ } are vectors of household final good consumption and the global pollutant stock. Utility is increasing in consumption at a decreasing rate, and falling
in the pollutant stock at an increasing rate. We assume there exists some finite level of the emission stock
Ē > 0 such that reaching this level is infinitely costly in terms of utility: lim u (ckt , Et+ ) = −∞ for some
Eν →Ē

ν ≥ t. The utility function above is very general,4 and for the analysis below there is no need to further
specify its functional form. The core property used of the utility function is that allowing the pollutant
4 The

utility function used in Acemoglu et al. (2012) is a more specific version of (1).
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stock to grow over time until some Eν ≥ Ē is infinitely costly, and therefore always optimal to avoid. The
remainder of the analysis will focus on unilateral policies that satisfy this neccesary condition for policy
optimality.
Households consume a final good Ykt , which is produced competitively using clean, c, and dirty, d,
intermediate goods according to
(2)


 ε
ε−1
ε−1
ε−1
Ykt = Ykctε +Ykdtε
,

where ε ∈ (0, ∞) is the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediates and Yk jt is the quantity of
intermediate j ∈ {c, d} used in country k final good production. Throughout this paper, we assume the
two intermediates are substitutes (ε > 1), i.e. the clean intermediate provides a service similar to the dirty
intermediate and can therefore substitute for the dirty intermediate and the functions it performs. Referring
to examples such as solar energy versus energy from nonrenewables, and the development of alternative,
more energy-efficient production methods, this is likely the empirically relevant case.5 Intermediate goods
are freely traded, so intermediate goods market clearing requires
(3)

Yh jt +Y f jt = Ỹh jt + Ỹ f jt

for both j ∈ {c, d} where Ỹk jt denotes country k production. We assume trade is balanced at every point in
time:
(4)



pdt Ykdt − Ỹkdt + pct Ykct − Ỹkct = 0,

where p jt is the intermediate j world market price. Intermediate goods are competitively produced according to the following production function, using labor, Lk jt , and a continuum of sector-specific machines,
xk jit , of quality Ak jit :
(5)

1−α−β

ˆ

Ỹk jt = Lk jt

0

1
α
A1−α
k jit xk jit di,

where i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the machine type, α, β ∈ (0, 1) and α + β < 0.6 Labor is perfectly mobile across
sectors, but immobile across countries, so that labor market clearing requires
(6)

Lkct + Lkdt = Lk .

Each machine is either competitively supplied or produced by a profit-maximizing monopolist; it can not
be traded internationally. The production of each machine requires ψ > 0 units of the final good Ykt and is
5 This

is confirmed by the recent results in Papageorgiou et al. (2013).
β → 0, the production function approaches the intermediates production function in Acemoglu et al. (2012), where, in equilibrium, output is CRS to labor. With international trade, price or productivity differences across countries then lead to a specialization
of (at least) one country in the production of a single good (Ricardian trade). Our results are robust to the case where β = 0 (detailed
proofs available on request).
6 For
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equal across sectors and machine varieties, so the monopolist maximizes πk jit = xk jit pk jit − ψ pkt where
pk jit is the time t price for machine k ji and pkt country k final good price.
Innovation

The economy advances through improvements in machine quality. At the beginning of every

period, each scientist decides what sector to innovate in. Within this sector, the scientist is randomly
allocated to one machine, and each machine is allocated to at most one scientist. If innovation is successful,
the new machine quality is 1 + γ > 1 times the quality in the previous period and the scientist receives a
1-period patent for his achievements. We assume property rights are not enforced across borders, so upon
a successful innovation, the scientist can only profitably sell its patent to a local machine producer. In the
other country this improvement will be copied immediately and the particular machine will be competitively
supplied. As a consequence, a home scientist’s innovation decision is independent of foreign machine
demand (and vice versa) and machine quality is equal across countries at all times.7 If innovation is not
successful, no patent is granted and the machine will be competitively supplied with the previous period
quality. Hence, sector j average machine quality, which will later be referred to as sector j technology
progresses according to

A jt = A jt−1 γzsWjt + 1 ,

(7)
where we define

ˆ
A jt ≡

(8)

1

A jit di
0

and sWjt ≡ sh jt + s f jt . z is the scientist’s probability of success in innovation which, for simplicity, we assume
to be equal across countries and sectors. Market clearing for scientists reads
skct + skdt = sk .

(9)
Environment

Emissions are caused by the production of the dirty intermediate. For simplicity, we assume

a single, global level of the emission stock and a common emission intensity of dirty good production in
home and foreign. The emissions stock evolves according to

(10)


Et+1 = f YW
dt− ,

n
o
W , Ỹ W , ..., Ỹ W
W
W
W
where YW
=
Ỹ
−
jt
jt−∞ , Ỹ jt ≡ Ỹh jt + Ỹ f jt and fỸ W ≥ 0 for ν ≤ t with strict inequality for ν = t.
jt−1
dt
jν

The emission stock at time t + 1 is increasing in time t dirty good production. The stock may be persistent,
implying that also dirty good production from some time ν < t positively affects the time t + 1 emission
stock. The above law of motion of the emission stock encompasses both the specification by Acemoglu
et al. (2012), and the alternative form proposed by Hourcade et al. (2012), which is more closely based on
7 Section

5 discusses the robustness of the main argument under alternative assumptions regarding technology spillovers.
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the climate science models.

3

Equilibrium

This section solves for the equilibrium of the model. We consider three types of policies. The first is a
tax on the production, or output, of clean or dirty intermediates, such that the cost of using intermediate
inputs equals p jt τk jt . Second, a government may implement a tax on the use of intermediates as inputs,
on either, or both intermediates. This tax reduces the price intermediate input producers receive for their
intermediates to p jt τ̃k−1
jt . Lastly, a sector-specific subsidy to innovation, at a rate qk jt − 1, may be introduced.
In addition to the environmental externality, the model features a market failure in monopoly distortions.
For convenience, we assume that in both countries, monopoly distortions have been corrected for by the
appropriate subsidy granted to machine users. This would amount to a subsidy rate of (1 − α) on machines
supplied by monopolists. Throughout the exposition, we abstract from subsidies on intermediate production
and input use, focusing on positive taxes instead. We first solve for the static equilibrium, and evaluate
how the unilateral introduction of input and output taxes affect demand and supply for given technologies.
Next, we determine scientists innovation decisions and the effect of unilateral carbon taxes and innovation
subsidies thereon. In order to focus the analysis on the divergence of policies in home and foreign, we
abstract from foreign taxes and subsidies: τ̃ f jt = τ f jt = q f jt = 1 for both j ∈ {c, d}.

3.1

The static equilibrium

Final good producers maximize their input mix by equating the marginal return to intermediate Yk jt to its
tax-inclusive price τk jt p jt . Using (2), country k relative demand for intermediates reads
Ykct
=
Ykdt

(11)



pct
pdt

−ε 

τkct
τkdt

−ε
.

Introducing a positive intermediate input tax on the dirty intermediate will, given the world market relative
price pct /pdt , increase the demand for the clean intermediate relative to dirty. The final good price in
 1
1−ε
1−ε 1−ε 1−ε
. Global relative demand for intermediates will
country k then equals pkt = p1−ε
ct τkct + pdt τkdt
naturally lie between Yhct /Yhdt and Y f ct /Y f dt . Using trade balance, (4), we find
YctW
=
YdtW

(12)



pct
pdt

−ε
F,

where Y jtW ≡ Yh jt +Y f jt is world demand for intermediate j and F is a factor that adjusts for the individual
countries intermediate input taxes, and the relative size of each country’s demand.8 This factor is falling
in τhct /τhdt : the introduction of a dirty intermediate input tax in home reduces global relative demand for
this intermediate. Whenever τhct /τhdt < 1, i.e. whenever home’s relative tax on dirty intermediates exceeds
8 More

specifically, F is defined by F ≡

I R +V R
I R (τhct /τhdt )ε +V R

with I R ≡

7

pct Ỹhct +pdt Ỹhdt
pct Ỹ f ct +pdt Ỹ f dt

and V R ≡

(τhct /τhdt )ε +(pct /pdt )1−ε
1+(pct /pdt )1−ε

.

foreign’s we find Yhct /Yhdt > YctW /YdtW > Y f ct /Y f dt . If home is large relative to foreign (i.e. it produces a
large share of global output), YctW /YdtW will be relatively close to Yhct /Yhdt .9 This is intuitive, as in this case,
home demand represents a large share of global demand.
Intermediate producers demand machines until the marginal return to machines equals the machine
price. With optimal machine subsidies, the cost of a machine to intermediate good producers always equals
machine production cost, ψ pkt . By (5) equilibrium demand for machine ji in country k reads

(13)

xk jit =

− 1
pkt 1−α

1
1−α

p jt

1−α−β
− 1
τ̃k jt1−α Lk jt1−α


A jit

α
ψ



1
1−α

.

Intermediate output taxes affect machine demand directly. By reducing the marginal return to machine use,
they reduce machine demand for given world intermediate prices. Also positive intermediate input taxes are
detrimental for machine demand, as they increase the price of final output, and thereby machine production
cost and prices. Profit-maximizing monopolists charge a constant markup over marginal cost. This gives a
revenue per machine of ψ pkt /α, which, using (13), pins down profits for the machine-producing monopolist
at
(14)

1

− α

− 1



1−α−β

πk jit = (1 − α) pkt 1−α p jt1−α τ̃k jt1−α Lk jt1−α A jit

α
ψ



α
1−α

.

Machine profits are increasing in machine demand, which is increasing in machine productivity, A jit and
1

1−α−β

− 1

the marginal return to machine use, p jt1−α τ̃k jt1−α Lk jt1−α . Labor is mobile across sectors, yet not across
countries, and its allocation is determined by where it earns the greatest marginal return. By (5) and (13)
the marginal return to labor in sector j reads
(15)

1

− α

− 1



− β

MRLk jt = (1 − α − β ) pkt 1−α p jt1−α τ̃k jt1−α Lk jt1−α A jt

α
ψ



α
1−α

.

The marginal return to labor in a sector is falling in the amount of labor employed in this sector. Labor
market equilibrium then requires marginal return to be equalized across sectors. This gives

(16)

Lkct
=
Lkdt



pct
pdt

1 
β

τ̃kct
τ̃kdt

− 1 
β

Act
Adt

 1−α
β

Finally, using (5) and (13), production of intermediate j in country k reads

(17)

Ỹk jt =

− α
pkt 1−α

α
1−α

p jt

1−α−β
− α
τ̃k jt1−α Lk jt1−α


A jt

α
ψ



α
1−α

.

9 If I R → 0, the framework approaches a single-country model where home is the sole country, and F → (τ /τ )−ε which gives
hct hdt
YctW /YdtW → Yhct /Yhdt . Likewise, if I R → ∞, we have F → 1 and YctW /YdtW → Y f ct /Y f dt .
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which gives global relative supply

(18)

ỸctW
Act
=
W
Adt
Ỹdt

where we define K ≡ pht /p f t

−

α
1−α



pct
pdt



α
1−α

− α

1−α−β

− α

1−α−β

1−α−β

K τ̃hct1−α Lhct1−α + L f ct1−α
1−α−β

K τ̃hdt1−α Lhdt1−α + L f dt1−α

. Global relative intermediates supply is a function of relative produc-

tivity, Act /Adt , intermediates prices, pct /pdt , and the labor allocation. The greater clean sector productivity,
higher clean intermediate prices and the more labor is employed in this sector, the larger the relative supply
of clean intermediates. Domestic labor is corrected by two factors. The first, K, corrects for differences
in machine prices across countries. If home imposes a tax on either intermediate input, this factor will be
below unity: due to the net taxation of intermediates, machines will be more expensive, and machine use
per unit of labor will be lower. Hence, output per unit of labor in home will fall short of output per unit
of labor in foreign. In a similar manner, a high intermediate output tax in sector j, will reduce the use of
machines and output per unit of labor in this sector.
In equilibrium, the labor allocation and intermediate prices are jointly determined by global intermediate
goods market equilibrium, (3), (12) and (18), and labor market equilibrium, through (6) and (16). Using
these conditions, the laissez-faire equilibrium can be solved in a rather straightforward manner. Next, we
summarize the effect of unilateral policies on the equilibrium labor allocation, prices, and the pattern of
trade.
Laissez-faire equilibrium In laissez-faire, no intermediate input or output taxes are introduced: τ̃k jt =
τk jt = 1 for both k ∈ {h, f } and j ∈ {c, d}. As a consequence, producers and consumers face identical
prices in both countries. Global relative intermediate demand will equal relative intermediate demand in
the individual countries:
(19)

YctW
Ykct
YW
=
and ctW =
W
Ykdt
Ydt
Ydt



pct
pdt

−ε
,

and by (11) and (16)-(18), we find the relative supply of intermediates

(20)

ỸctW
Ỹkct
ỸctW
=
and
=
Ỹkdt
ỸdtW
ỸdtW



pct
pdt

 1−β 
β

Act
Adt

 1−α
β

.

Equilibrium relative prices then equal

(21)

pct
=
pdt



Act
Adt

−

1−α
1+(ε−1)β

.

Since ε > 1, the relative price is falling in the relative productivity: advancements in clean productivity
reduce the price of clean intermediates relative to dirty intermediates. From (16) and (21) we derive the
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equilibrium labor allocation:

Lkct
=
Lkdt

(22)



Act
Adt



σ
1+(ε−1)β

,

where σ ≡ (1 − α) (ε − 1) > 0. As both consumers and intermediate good producers face identical prices
across countries, no strict gains from trade exists, and we assume no trade will take place.10 Equations (6),
(17), (21) and (22) then determine country k clean, dirty and final good production


 1−β −ε(1−α−β ) ε(1−α) 1−α−β   α
σ
σ
σ
α 1−α
1+(ε−1)β
1+(ε−1)β
Ỹkct = Act
,
+ Adt
Act1+(ε−1)β Lk 1−α
ψ

 1−β −ε(1−α−β ) ε(1−α) 1−α−β   α
σ
σ
σ
α 1−α
1+(ε−1)β
1+(ε−1)β
Ỹkdt = Act
+ Adt
Adt1+(ε−1)β Lk 1−α
,
ψ

 1+(ε−1)β 1−α−β   α
σ
σ
σ
α 1−α
and Ykt = Act1+(ε−1)β + Adt1+(ε−1)β
Lk 1−α
,
ψ

(23)

where by the absence of trade Ỹk jt = Yk jt .
Unilateral policy Equilibrium relative prices, as well as the production and consumption of intermediate and final goods are less straightforward to derive if home implements intermediate input or output
taxes. We can however draw the following conclusion regarding the pattern of trade:
β
−ε 1−β

Lemma 1. Define Tht ≡ (τhct /τhdt )

(τ̃hct /τ̃hdt ). If Tht > (<)1, home is a dirty (clean) intermediate

exporter, and foreign is a clean (dirty) intermediate exporter. If Tht = 1, no trade takes place and, for given
technologies, unilateral policies leave equilibrium relative prices and foreign demand, supply and labor
allocation unaffected.
Proof Let pRkt ≡ pkct /pkdt be the country k equilibrium relative price under autarky and ptR ≡ pct /pdt the
− 1+β1−α
(ε−1)

world equilibrium relative price. By (11), (16) and (17), pRht = (Act /Adt )
− 1+β1−α
(ε−1)

(Act /Adt )

1−β

Tht1+β (ε−1) and pRft =

. If Tht > 1, pRht > pRft which implies that in our free trade equilibrium we must have

pRht > ptR > pRft . Compared to the autarky case, the lower relative price will increase home demand for
the clean relative to the dirty intermediate, yet reduce home supply of clean relative to dirty intermediates.
Hence, home becomes a clean intermediate importer and a dirty intermediate exporter. Similarly, if Tht < 1,
in autarky, pRht < pRft , so pRht < ptR < pRft and home exports the clean intermediate. If Tht = 1, opening up to
trade does not affect equilibrium relative prices, labor allocation, demand or supply. No trade takes place
and unilateral policies leave foreign unaffected.
10 This

assumption can be substantiated by allowing for arbitrarily small trade costs.
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Tht is a measure of the degree to which home distorts intermediates demand relative to supply. By
implementing a net tax on dirty production (τ̃hct < τ̃hdt ), home reduces the return to dirty relative to clean
intermediates production, distorting its supply in favor of clean intermediates. Similarly, implementing a
net tax on dirty consumption (τhct < τhdt ), distorts home demand is in favor of clean intermediates. If Tht
equals unity, the demand and supply distortions cancel out. In this case, the introduction of the tax does not
affect equilibrium relative prices, and no trade will take place. If Tht is below unity, the distortion of production in favor of clean intermediates is larger than the shift in consumption towards clean intermediates.
As a consequence, at laissez-faire prices, relative supply of clean intermediates exceeds relative demand.
Equilibrium is then re-established by a fall in pct /pdt , which increases relative clean intermediate demand
globally, and causes foreign to become a dirty intermediate exporter.

3.2

The dynamic equilibrium

Scientists decide upon in which sector to innovate based on profit expectations. As scientists receive a
1-period patent, they only take the next period into account. Scientists are randomly allocated to a machine,
which gives expected machine quality if successful (1 + γ)A jt−1 . Accounting for the probability of success,
z, and noting that unsuccessful scientists will not make a profit, by (14), expected profits for a country k
scientist innovating in sector j read
− α
Πk jt = z(1 + γ) (1 − α) pkt 1−α

1
1−α

p jt

1−α−β
− 1
τ̃kdt1−α Lk jt1−α


A jt−1

α
ψ



α
1−α

,

which, by (16), gives relative expected profits

(24)

Πkct
=
Πkdt



pct
pdt



1
1−α



τ̃kct
τ̃kdt

−

1
1−α



Lkct
Lkdt

 1−α−β
1−α

Act−1 qkct
,
Adt−1 qkdt

where q f jt = 1 for both j ∈ {c, d}. If relative expected profits exceed unity in country k, research in the
clean sector is more profitable than in the dirty sector. As a consequence, country k scientists will relocate
from the dirty to the clean sector. Similarly, if Πkct /Πkdt < 1, scientists relocate to the dirty sector. We
assume that, if a scientist is indifferent, it innovates in the clean sector. Analogous to Acemoglu et al.
(2012), we can identify price, market size and technology effects. The price effect is due to pct /pdt : a
high relative price in sector j increases demand for machines and machine profits in this sector. This effect
must however be corrected for output taxes, which reduce the net return to intermediates production in a
sector. Hence, a relatively high output tax in sector j reduces the incentive to innovate in this sector. To the
contrary a high innovation subsidy, qk jt , encourages innovation in sector j. Next, innovation in a sector is
favorable if this sector employs a large share of labor. This is called the market size effect. The final effect
is the technology effect: the more advanced a sector’s technology, A jt−1 , the greater the expected benefits
from further improvements.
Again, we can solve for the laissez-faire equilibrium and the equilibrium under unilateral policies.
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Laissez-faire equilibrium In the laissez-faire equilibrium, in addition to τ̃k jt = τk jt = 1 we have
qk jt = 1 for both k ∈ {h, f }and j ∈ {c, d}. Using (21) and (7), we reduce (24) to
Πkct
=
Πkdt

(25)



Act−1
Adt−1



σ
1+(ε−1)β



γzsW
ct + 1
γzsW
dt + 1

)
− 1−(ε−1)(1−α−β
1+(ε−1)β

,

where sWjt ≡ sh jt + s f jt . As σ > 0, innovation favors the more advanced sector, which reinforces initial
patterns of development are reinforced. Suppose that at time 0, dirty technologies are relatively advanced
(Ac0 /Ad0 is low), such that the majority of time 1 scientists innovates in the dirty sector. By (7), dirty
technologies grow faster than clean, which implies that the next period, again, a majority of scientists are
active in this sector.
Multiple equilibrium scientist allocations may arise if (ε − 1)(1 − α − β ) > 1. In this case, relative
expected profits are increasing in the share of scientists innovating in this sector. This is due to the following.
The more scientists innovate in the clean sector, given Act−1 /Adt−1 , the larger Act /Adt . A greater Act /Adt
implies that the relative price for the clean intermediate, pct /pdt , will be lower. This reduces the return
to clean innovation and thereby Πkct /Πkdt . However, a larger Act /Adt also implies more labor will be
employed in the clean sector, which encourages additional clean sector innovation. If (ε − 1)(1 − α − β ) >
1, the latter effect dominates and an increase in the number of scientists active in a sector will further
encourage research in this sector. As a consequence, multiple equilibria, where all scientists innovate in
either the clean, or the dirty sector, may arise. Whenever this is the case, i.e. whenever both sW
ct = 0 and
W
W
sW
ct = s is an equilibrium, where s ≡ sh + s f , we assume scientists coordinate on the ’clean equilibrium’
W
with sW
ct = s .

As has been noted above, the intial level of technologies will determine the innovation decision in
laissez-faire. In the remainder of the paper, we assume the following:


 1−(ε−1)(1−α−β )
− 1−(ε−1)(1−α−β )
Ac0
W
W
σ
σ
, γzs + 1
,
Assumption 1. A < min γzs + 1
d0

Assumption 1 ensures that in the absence of intervention, for any scientist allocation, Πkc1 /Πkd1 < 1 for
both k ∈ {h, f }: scientists in both countries start innovating in the dirty sector only, Act /Adt falls over time
and innovation continues to take place in the dirty sector only. By (23) and (10), the persistent growth in Adt
causes Ỹhdt + Ỹ f dt and the emission stock, Et , to grow over time. As a consequence, Eν ≥Ē at some finite
time ν, which implies Ukt = −∞. Given the high cost of Eν ≥Ē, there is a strong call for a social planner to
curb emission growth. This result is symmetric to Propositions 1 and 2 in Acemoglu et al. (2012).
Unilateral policy Using innovation subsidies, qh jt , home can, in a rather straightforward manner,
redirect its scientists to the clean or dirty sector. Such subsidies affect foreign scientists’ innovation incenW
tives through the terms sW
ct and sdt . This can best be seen if home does not implement any intermediate
input or output taxes, in which case (25) applies for foreign. For example, suppose home uses subsidies to
W
increase shct at the expense of shdt . Given the scientist allocation in foreign, sW
ct rises and sdt falls. Here,

if (ε − 1)(1 − α − β ) > 1, this increase in shct will increase foreign scientists’ incentive to innovate in the
clean sector. If instead (ε − 1)(1 − α − β ) < 1, substitution will take place and, if feasible, any increase
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in shct will be countered by an equivalent decrease in s f ct . If (ε − 1)(1 − α − β ) = 1, foreign innovation is
independent of the home allocation of scientists, and thereby of qh jt .
Also intermediate input and output taxes affect scientists’ innovation decisions, in both home and foreign. Substituting (16) in (25) we find

(26)

Πkct
=
Πkdt



pct
pdt

1 
β

τ̃kct
τ̃kdt

− 1 
β

Act−1
Adt−1

 1−α 
β

γzsW
ct + 1
γzsW
dt + 1

 1−α−β
β

qkct
qkdt

In home, a net tax on dirty intermediate output (τ̃hct /τ̃hdt < 1) encourages innovation in the dirty sector.
For given relative prices, this tax reduces the return to dirty intermediate production, which, both directly
and through reduced labor use in this sector, reduces demand for dirty machines and hence the profits that
flow from dirty machine varieties. Relative to the dirty sector, clean sector innovation has become more
profitable. As established above, unilateral policies may alter global equilibrium relative prices. An increase
in the price of the clean intermediate increases demand for clean machines and profits in the clean sector.
This effect is present not only in home, but also in foreign. Hence, as the following Lemma establishes,
home can affect the foreign scientists’ innovation decision through equilibrium relative prices.
ε
− 1−β

Lemma 2. Let Tht ≡ (τhct /τhdt )

(τ̃hct /τ̃hdt ) and take sh jt as given. If Tht > (<)1 the incentive for

foreign scientists to innovate in the clean sector is increased (reduced) relative to laissez-faire. If Tht = 1,
unilateral policies do not affect foreign scientist’ incentives.
Proof For a given sh jt , Act−1 /Adt−1 , and s f ct equal to its laissez-faire level of zero, we know Act /Adt .
Lemma 1 established that, for given Act /Adt , if Tht > 1, pct /pdt will rise above the laissez-faire level. By
(26), this will increase the relative return to clean innovation in foreign, increasing the incentive for its
scientists to innovate in the clean sector. Likewise, if Tht < (=)1, pct /pdt falls (is unchanged), and so is
Π f ct /Π f dt . 
Lemma 2 implies that in addition to a ’static’ leakage channel, we can identify a ’dynamic’ leakage
channel. Carbon taxes which cause the relative price of dirty intermediates to rise, trigger higher supply
of dirty intermediates in foreign, as compared to the case without such taxes. This, well-known, effect of
carbon tax policies is called leakage. We refer to this leakage as static, as it takes technologies as given. The
increase in the relative price of dirty intermediates also affects technologies. By Lemma 2, a fall in pct /pdt
increases the incentive to innovate in the dirty sector. This may increase the number of foreign scientists in
the dirty sector,11 which increases next-period Ad , and therefore, for given policies, next-period emissions.
This leakage channel, running through innovation incentives, is what we call the dynamic leakage channel.
11 Foreign innovation in the dirty sector will rise, unless the initial equilibrium satisfies either of the following requirements: 1) All
foreign scientists innovate in dirty, or 2) All foreign scientists innovate in clean and, given the initial scientist allocation and despite
the fall in pct /pdt , Π f ct /Π f dt ≥ 1 still.
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4

Sustainable growth and unilateral policies

The previous section establishes that in laissez-faire the emission stock exceeds levels considered as extremely harmful in finite time. This section assesses whether unilateral policies can redirect the economy
to a more sustainable growth trajectory. As defined below, the emission stock will always be below the
threshold level of Ē on such a trajectory.
Definition 1. On a sustainable growth path, Eν < Ē for all ν.
As allowing the emission stock to pass the level of Ē is considered infinitely costly, if feasible, the social
planner will always implement a sustainable growth trajectory.

4.1

Unilateral implementation of a sustainable growth path

At time t, home can unilaterally implement a sustainable growth path if intermediates are so-called ’strong
substitutes’,12 Ē is sufficiently large, and if it can implement policies that redirect the majority of scientists
to the clean sector:
Lemma 3. Home can unilaterally implement a sustainable growth path at time t if ε ≥
sufficiently large, and there exist unilateral policies that implement

sW
ct

1−β
1−α−β ,

Ē is

> sW
dt .

Proof See Appendix. 
Though the mathematical proof is tedious, the argument is immediate. Home can always engineer an
equilibrium in which it eliminates all domestic demand for, and supply of, dirty intermediates. In this
equilibrium, no trade takes place, and global dirty intermediates production equals its production, and demand, in foreign, at the laissez-faire (autarky) level. As it turns out, for given technologies, this equilibrium
minimizes global emissions.13 Thus, to prevent global emissions from rising over time, preventing foreign
demand for dirty intermediates from rising is key. Advances in dirty technologies increase foreign demand
for dirty intermediates by increasing income and by reducing the price of dirty relative to clean intermediates. Clean technology improvements reduce foreign dirty intermediate demand, as long as the substitution
effect from relatively cheaper clean intermediates (see (21)) outweighs the income effect from increased
output. This is the case if ε > (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β ). If ε = (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β ), Y f dt is independent of
Act . Implementing a sustainable growth path thus requires ε ≥ (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β ) and sufficiently faster
growth in Act than Adt . This can only be implemented if home can, at time t, redirect the majority of global
scientists to the clean sector. If home is unable to do so, Ac /Ad falls over time, which increases the relative
return to dirty sector innovation, rendering home unable to redirect a sufficient number of scientists in any
future period. Absent of further policies, implementing a sustainable growth path implies that in finite time,
no further dirty machine improvements will be made. If ε > (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β ), this implies E∞ = 0.
12 We

borrow the notion of strong substitutes from (see Acemoglu et al., 2012), yet for β > 0 our definition is slightly different.
foreign dirty intermediate demand below the laissez-faire level in (23) requires increasing the price of dirty relative to
clean intermediates, which would increase foreign (and hence global) supply of these intermediates beyond the laissez-faire level.
13 Reducing
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Finally, even if in the long run, pollution can be halted or eliminated, Et might still rise initially, so Ē must
be sufficiently large for the stock of emissions to remain below this level along the process.
The next step in the analysis is to determine under what conditions home can indeed unilaterally impleW
ment sW
ct > sdt . Here we distinguish two cases. In the first case, home inhabits the majority of scientists.

In the second case, home and foreign are either equally innovative, or foreign scientists outnumber those in
home.
4.1.1

Home inhabits majority of scientists

If home inhabits the majority of scientists, i.e. if sh > s f , the domestic social planner can always redirect
a sufficient number of scientists by offering an innovation subsidy to scientists in the clean sector. An
alternative is to reduce the returns to dirty innovation by taxing the production of dirty intermediates. In
the absence of innovation subsidies or output taxation, a dirty intermediate input tax may redirect home
scientists to the clean sector. By reducing global demand for dirty intermediates, such a tax causes the
world market price of dirty intermediates to fall, causing a fall in the expected return to dirty innovation
(see (24)). Using innovation subsidies or dirty output taxes, at any point in time, home can implement
W
sW
c > sd , causing Ac /Ad to grow. As a growing Ac /Ad increases relative profits, this policy intervention is

only necessary for a limited period of time, and also foreign scientists will, as of some point in time, start
innovating in the clean sector.
Proposition 1 If ε ≥

1−β
1−α−β , sh

> s f , and Ē is sufficiently large, unilateral policies can redirect the global

economy to a sustainable growth path. Such (temporary) policies correspond to a clean innovation subsidy,
or a tax on dirty intermediates production, or both. Alternatively, a tax on dirty intermediate inputs may be
capable of redirecting home scientists to the clean sector.
Proof In text. 

4.1.2

Home inhabits minority of scientists

Implementing a sustainable path requires redirecting foreign scientists to the clean sector if sh ≤ s f . To
redirect these scientists, home must, for any scientist allocation, implement policies that increase the world
market price of clean intermediates. In response to this price increase, foreign will expand the size of its
clean sector at the expense of dirty, increasing foreign scientists’ incentives to innovate in the clean sector.
These policies thus cause negative leakage, and turn foreign in a clean intermediate exporter. An example of
such a policy is a net tax on dirty intermediate inputs, which increases home, and hence global, demand in
favor of clean intermediates. Alternatively, home could introduce a net tax on clean intermediate production,
which reduces home supply of this intermediate. In both cases, the increase in clean intermediates demand
net of supply will increase the price of clean intermediates relative to dirty. Unilateral policies that cause
positive carbon leakage and turn foreign in a dirty intermediate exporter will not implement sustainable
growth. Any expansion of dirty intermediates production in foreign will encourage foreign innovation in
this sector, which is the exact opposite of what home aims to achieve.
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Whether home can unilaterally implement a sustainable growth path depends on the size of its labor
force relative to foreign’s, and initial technologies. First, if the home country is relatively large in terms of
its labor force, home produces a large share of global intermediates. This implies that home can implement
large shifts in global intermediates supply, and thereby large changes in equilibrium relative prices. Put
differently, a large country has greater control over prices and corresponding allocation of production across
countries. This is beneficial, as redirecting foreign scientists may require sizable increases in the size of the
clean sector in foreign. Second, if clean technologies are relatively advanced, the size of the clean sector,
and thereby the return to clean innovation is relatively high to begin with. Hence, a smaller shift in the price
equilibrium is required to suffiently increase the return to clean innovation in foreign. Hence, we can prove
the following
Proposition 2 If ε ≥

1−β
1−α−β

and sh ≤ s f , for a sufficiently large Ē, Lh /L f and Act−1 /Adt−1 , unilateral

policies can, at time t, redirect the global economy to a sustainable growth path. Such policies reduce the
relative price of dirty intermediates relative to laissez-faire.
Proof See Appendix. 

4.2

Myopic policies

A social planner may not recognize the endogeneity of technical change and thereby fail to take the effect of
its policies on innovation in general, and foreign innovation in particular, into account. In such a situation,
the social planner implements myopic policies. Myopic policies are unilateral policies that are optimal
under the (false) presumption that innovation is exogenous. Concerning such policies, we can prove the
following14
Proposition 3 Myopic policies increase the global relative price of dirty intermediates relative to laissezfaire.
Proof See Appendix. 
The rationale behind Proposition 3 runs as follows. Because of the negative welfare effects of emissions
due to dirty intermediates production, the myopic policymaker aims to reduce global dirty intermediates
supply relative to laissez-faire. A reduction in global dirty intermediates supply implies an equivalent
drop in global use of dirty intermediates in final output. This latter drop causes consumption, and thereby
utility losses. For a given level of pollution reduction, the social planner faces three options. First, it
can implement policies that leave equilibrium relative intermediate prices, pct /pdt , and thereby foreign
demand for and supply of dirty intermediates, unaffected. In this case, the full reduction, and accompanying
utility loss, comes at the expense of domestic consumers. Second, home can increase the price of dirty
intermediates relative to clean. As a consequence, demand for dirty intermediates falls in foreign. Carbon
leakage will occur however: foreign dirty intermediate producers respond to the higher dirty intermediate
price by increasing their production. Third, if home reduces the price of dirty intermediates relative to
14 Even though the maximization problem changes slightly, Proposition 3 continues to hold if the domestic government (falsely)
presumes property rights are perfectly enforced internationally.
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clean, foreign dirty intermediate demand increases relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium. So, to reach
the emission reduction goal, home must reduce the use of dirty intermediates in final goods production in
excess of the reduction goal, and utility losses are increased relative to the case with an unchanged price
ratio. This third option can thus never be optimal: home will never implement policies that reduce the world
market price of the dirty intermediate and foreign production of dirty intermediates. Also, one can show
that the first option is suboptimal: home prefers to share the utility losses from reduced dirty intermediate
consumption with foreign.
As myopic policies do not account for the effect of production taxes on technological change, the above
policy is independent of the number of scientists in the two countries. From Proposition 2, the next corollary
follows
Corollary 1 If ε ≥

1−β
1−α−β ,

s f > sh and Lh /L f and Act−1 /Adt−1 sufficiently large, myopic policies are

inconsistent with optimal policies.
Proof By Proposition 2, if ε ≥ (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β ), s f > sh and Ē, Lh /L f and Act−1 /Adt−1 sufficiently
large, unilateral policies can redirect the economy to a sustainable growth path. Such policies reduce the
relative price of dirty intermediates vis-a-vis laissez faire. By Proposition 3, myopic policies implement the
opposite: an increase in the relative price of dirty intermediates. 
This contradiction between myopic and optimal policies can have far-reaching consequences. Under
myopic policies, the share of labor employed in foreign dirty intermediates production will increase, so, by
(24) and Assumption 1, all foreign scientists continue to innovate in the dirty sector. If foreign inhabits the
majority of scientists, such policies will not implement this sustainable growth path even if the conditions
in Proposition 2 were satisfied, this would have been feasible and hence optimal.

5

Calibration

Up to this point, the analysis of unilateral policies has been analytical, allowing us to draw qualitative
conclusions only. In this section, we perform a simple calibration exercise and address more quantitative
issues. By seeing the model at work, it enhances our understanding of its implications and allows us to
draw additional conclusions related to what coalitions are capable of implementing sustainable growth, the
level of the required tax rates for sustainability, and short-run effects of unilateral policies. Given the strong
assumptions of our framework, the simple trade structure, and the fact it only includes 2 abstract sectors,
the exercise below should mostly be interpreted as a first inquiry into the economic significance of the
mechanism at work.

5.1

Parameter values

To allow the reader to compare our framework to Acemoglu et al. (2012), parameters are chosen in line
with their framework. This implies we choose α + β = 1/3, γz = 0.02, ψ = α and LW = 1 and sW = 1. We
have no reliable priors regarding the appropriate size of β . The model has been run for several β 0 s. Qualitatively, results are independent of the β selected. With the exception of the level of required taxes, also
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quantitatively, differences are small. To keep the exposition short we only report on the case of β = 1/30.15
Acemoglu et al. (2012) use three different values for the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty
varieties: 3, 5 and 10. Several researchers (Pelli, 2011; Hourcade et al., 2012; Papageorgiou et al., 2013)
regard these elastiticies of substitution as (too) high. To acknowledge this critique, we select the lowest
value of the three values: ε = 3.16 For these parameter values, the condition ε ≥ (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β ) is always satisfied. Throughout we assume that Ē is suffienctly high such that, if home can implement a growth
path that prevents dirty output from rising in the long run, this growth path is sustainable. This implies we
abstract from the question whether growth can be redirected sufficiently fast. One could reinterpret this as
answering the question whether there exists some emission concentration level E 0 < ∞, that we are able to
avoid.

5.2

Results

Figure 1 plots the combinations of Lh /L f and Act−1 /Adt−1 that allow home to implement a sustainable
growth path as of time t if sh ≤ s f . In line with our analytical result, given Lh /L f , a larger Act−1 /Adt−1
makes it more likely home can implement a sustainable growth trajectory. For Act−1 /Adt−1 close to zero,
i.e. clean technology that is very basic compared to dirty, no unilateral policy will be able to redirect the
economy to a sustainable growth trajectory. To the contrary, if Act−1 /Adt−1 exceeds the level implied by
Assumption 1, growth is already sustainable in laissez-faire, and no policy is required to implement such
a growth trajectory. Similarly, given Act−1 /Adt−1 , the greater Lh /L f , the more likely home can redirect
foreign scientists to the clean sector. The rationale is immediate: home redirects foreign scientists through
taxation policies which increases the world price of the clean intermediate. The larger home, the larger share
it represents of the world economy, and the larger the effect of home taxation on the global equilibrium.
Figure 1: Minimum country size for implementing sustainable growth if sh ≤ s f

Figure 1 applies as long as sh ≤ s f , yet is independent of the exact levels of sh and s f . This may
for alternative β 0 s are available on request.
value is in line with the findings by Papageorgiou et al. (2013).
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seem counterintuitive at first, but is a direct consequence of the fact that home and foreign scientists are
perfect substitutes, with equal productivity, in innovation (see (7)). Figure 2 maps several coalitions in

Lh /L f , sh /s f -space, where coalitions’ size in terms of relative labor and scientists are calibrated using
WEO GDP and WIPO patent data. Taking Act−1 /Adt−1 = 0.45, the ratio consistent with IEA statistics17 ,
we can identify three areas. In area I, sh > s f and Proposition 1 applies: the coalition dominates global innovation and can implement sustainable growth by redirecting its own scientists to the clean sector. Examples
of such coalitions are the countries with binding targets under the Kyoto treaty (henceforth referred to as
the Kyoto coalition)18 plus the US, or a coalition of G8 countries. Also area II coalitions, such as the Kyoto
coalition or a coalition of the EU and US, can implement sustainable growth. However, because sh ≤ s f ,
these coalitions must redirect foreign innovation to the clean sector. The smaller coalitions in area III cannot
implement sustainable growth. These are the coalitions that are insufficiently innovative to redirect global
growth by redirecting domestic scientists only, but also too small to redirect foreign scientists to the clean
sector. The EU and US find themselves in this situation (note that in the figure, the EU and US are hard to
distinguish).19
Figure 2: Coalitions that can (I and II) and cannot (III) implement sustainable growth

For area I coalitions, a clean innovation subsidy is sufficient to redirect the majority of scientists to the
clean sector. If the coalition does not inhabit the majority of scientists, but is sufficiently large (area II
coalitions), taxes on clean intermediate output, and/or dirty intermediate inputs are required to implement a
sustainable growth trajectory. Figure 3 takes a closer look at such tax rates. It depicts the minimum taxes
required on clean intermediate output for different levels of Lh /L f , given Act−1 /Adt−1 = 0.45 and the tax
rate on dirty intermediate inputs. A clean output tax below zero should be interpreted as the negative of
the dirty output tax. From Figure 3 we learn that the larger the country, the lower the tax rate required to
17 We

use the 2013 ratio between global energy use from renewable and nonrenewable sources to approximate for Act−1 /Adt−1 .
Kyoto coalition includes the EU countries, Australia, Belarus, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Turkey, Switzerland
and Ukraine (no data was seperately available for Monaco). This corresponds to all Annex I parties excluding Canada and the US (see
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php).
19 This conclusion no longer applies for very high β . In that case the calibrated labor size of the US and EU just pass the level
required for implementing sustainable growth.
18 This
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implement a sustainable growth trajectory. This is intuitive, a given tax rate has a larger effect on world
supply and demand, and hence world relative prices, if the country where this tax is introduced is larger.
Also, if the tax rate on dirty intermediate consumption is already high, a lower tax rate on clean intermediate
production is required to redirect a sufficient number of foreign scientists to the clean sector. For the Kyoto
coalition, tax rates are very high. For example, with a 100% tax on dirty intermediate inputs, the minimum
tax required on clean intermediate output is 8%. If we reduce the tax on the use of dirty intermediate to
50%, unilaterally implementing sustainable growth is no longer feasible. In terms of numbers, a 100% tax
on dirty intermediates would correspond to a tax of 1700 $/tCO2.20 This result raises the question whether
the unilateral implementation of a sustainable growth trajectory is politically feasible.
Figure 3: Minimum tax rates for implementing sustainable growth

The next table illustrates the short run implications of unilateral policies implementing a sustainable
growth path. By raising the relative price of clean intermediates, unilateral policies do not only encourage clean innovation in foreign, but also the demand for dirty intermediates. Put differently, policy has
a dynamic effect on emission through redirecting innovation and altering Act /Adt , but also a direct effect
for given Act /Adt .21 As a consequence, we cannot exclude the possibility of short-run emission increases.
Table 1 depicts the short run effect of policies from Figure 3 on global dirty intermediate output. It breaks
down the full effect from unilateral policies into an innovation and the tax effect. Here, the innovation effect
is defined as the effect of redirecting innovation on emissions, and the tax effect the effect of policies on
emissions, given that all scientists innovate in the clean sector.
The effect of unilateral policies on short-run pollution turns out to be highly dependent on the specifics
of the tax policies implemented. The fact that policies encourage innovation in the clean sector reduces
dirty output in the short run. In addition to this innovation effect on global dirty output, the tax rates
implemented may then either cause an additional reduction or increase in global emissions in the short run.
20 In the model, a region’s CO2 intensity of GDP is equal to ξY /p Y where ξ is ton CO2 per unit of dirty intermediate output.
kdt
kt kt
Assuming laissez-faire, parameter values as described in the text, and world CO2 intensity of 0.44 kg/GDP, this allows us to compute
pdt (τhdt − 1) /ξ , the tax in $/tCO2.
21 Note again the timing of events. Time t policy is observed or anticipated by scientists s , which by (7) affects technology, A ,
jt
kt
and thereby time t output and pollution.
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Table 1: Short run global emission effect of unilateral policies for Lh /L f = 1.5
dirty input tax
rate

clean output
tax rate

full effect

innovation
effect

tax effect

0%
5%
10%
25%
50%

9%
8%
7%
5%
2%

-1%
-4%
-7%
-15%
-26%

-3%
-3%
-3%
-3%
-3%

2%
-1%
-4%
-12%
-23%

A reduction is more likely the larger the dirty intermediate input tax. This is intuitive, as given the relative
intermediates prices implemented by the policies, such a tax reduces home, and thus global demand for
dirty intermediates. Table 1 displays the effects only for Lh /L f = 1.5, yet qualitatively, it holds for any
Lh /L f . From Table 1, the full effect is always negative: also in the short run, unilateral policies reduce
pollution. The size of the innovation effect however, strongly depends on the rate of innovation in society
(γzsW ). The lower this rate, the smaller the innovation effect. With a positive effect of unilateral taxation
on short-run dirty intermediate production, a smaller innovation effect may turn the total effect of unilateral
policies on pollution positive in the short run.

6

Alternative modeling assumptions

Sustainable growth requires innovation to be clean in the long run. The unilateral implementation of a
positive carbon tax causes production of the polluting intermediate to relocate to the foreign country, and
thereby increases the incentive for foreign scientists to direct their research to this dirty sector. Hence, such
a unilateral tax may be unsuccessful in implementing a sustainable growth trajectory. In such a case, as
stated in Proposition 2, an opposite policy, which reduces the relative price of the dirty intermediate in the
short run, can in fact be optimal. Although counter-intuitive at first sight, the rationale is clear: such a policy
causes production of the clean intermediate to relocate to foreign, which increases the incentive for clean
innovation in this country. The allocation of foreign scientists is especially relevant if they are numerous
compared to home scientists: in this case they are the main factor determining innovation worldwide. The
above result is core to the paper, yet established under a strong set of assumptions: immediate technology
spillovers and the absence of international property rights protection. This section contains a short discussion of alternative assumptions, commonly used in the literature, and some initial insights how these may
affect this papers core results.
Di Maria and van der Werf (2008) present a 2-country framework of trade, induced technical change
and unilateral environmental policy wherein property rights are perfectly enforced internationally. Under
this assumption, the return to innovation in a sector is independent of the location of intermediates production and, abstracting from innovation subsidies, home and foreign scientists face identical innovation
incentives. As a consequence, with perfect international property rights protection, we find Proposition 2 no
longer applies. Perfect international property rights enforcement is however a very strong assumption too.
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Typically, licensing a patent abroad entails some additional adjustment or trade cost, and one may find the
probability of success in innovation enhanced by learning spillovers from local industries. A more realistic
assumption would be that scientists are responsive to global production, but more so to local production.22
This expands home’s set of policy options that encourage clean innovation in foreign. As a consequence, we
find a weakened version of Proposition 2 to apply, where home might have to become a dirty intermediate
exporter to redirect the economy to a sustainable growth tax if sh < s f .
Closely related to the assumption regarding international property rights protection is our assumption of
immediate technology spillovers. Even though, in the absence of such spillovers, the effects of policy measures will become dependent of the (differences between) country-specific technology levels, core insights
are only slightly altered. To implement a sustainable growth trajectory, unilateral policies must redirect the
majority of foreign scientists to the clean sector by increasing the size of foreign’s clean sector. So, under
this assumption, Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 apply for any s f > 0. This assertion is confirmed by Hemous
(2012), who finds that to unilaterally redirect the world economy to a sustainable growth trajectory, in the
long run, scientists in the unrestricted country must innovate in clean, or nonpolluting machines. Similarly, Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 are upheld in the intermediate case, where technologies require time
to diffuse. Here, in the long run, the country with the largest knowledge base determines the direction of
growth

7

Conclusion

In its aim to reduce emissions a climate coalition typically implements policies that increase the world price
of carbon intensive goods. This causes nonparticipants to expand their carbon intensive goods production
and carbon leakage to occur. In addition to this, well-known, static result, we identify a ’dynamic’ leakage
channel. The expansion of carbon intensive sectors will induce nonparticipant innovation in these sectors,
inducing future emission growth. As we show, this mechanism can have far-reaching consequences with
regard to optimal unilateral policies. Most notably, if nonparticipants drive global innovation, policies that
cause carbon leakage cannot prevent a continuing increase in global emissions. In this setting, unilateral
policies that sufficiently reduce the short run price of polluting goods and turn the coalition in a polluting
good exporter, redirect nonparticipants’ innovation to the nonpolluting sector and implement sustainable
growth. The coalition is more likely able to realize sustainable growth if it represents a large share of global
demand and if clean technologies are relatively advanced initially. The directedness of growth as well as
the importance of industry location for innovation are crucial determinants of optimal policies. A social
planner who fails to account for these will always implement policies that cause positive leakage, and may
therefore fail to achieve sustainable growth.
Naturally, results from a stylized model do not directly carry over to real-world policy implications.
The core insight that as unilateral action affects innovation incentives, the innovation potential outside the
22 For



example, one can redefine expected innovation profits as Πk jt = E πk jit + χπ−k jit where E is the expectations operator, −k
refers to the country other than k and χ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of international property right enforcement, expressed as the share of
profits in (14) a scientist captures if it sells its patent to a machine producer in the other country. As long as χ < 1, foreign scientists
are more responsive to local production.
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coalition may be a major determinant of optimal policies may well be relevant though. A quick glance
at the data reveals that three of the most innovative nations have no binding targets, or did not ratify the
Kyoto treaty.23 As innovators in these nations will, for a large part, determine the world’s long-run growth
trajectory, their incentives should be taken into account in the design of environmental policies. In this
light, the US and EU imposition of tariffs and minimum prices on Chinese solar panels may not only be
harmful to the environment in the short run, but may also have unfavorable long-run repercussions.24 A
simple calibration exercise confirms this picture: a coalition of countries with binding targets under the
Kyoto treaty is insufficiently innovative to implement sustainable growth without redirecting non-Kyoto
innovation. They are capable of doing the latter, albeit at the cost of very high tax rates on use of polluting
goods. Increasing the size of the coalition would allow for reduced tax rates.
It is highly likely that unilateral policies remain relevant for the foreseeable future. Past performance is
of course no guarantee for future results, but chances are that, like in the past decades, the UNFCCC will
continue to be unsuccessful in establishing a universal climate treaty with binding limits on emissions. And
even if a global agreement is reached, not all countries may implement the same set of policy measures.
Developing countries or countries whose industries would be a particularly hurt by the implementation of
stringent environmental policies may only cooperate conditional on certain provisions in the agreement.
Differential policies across different (groups of) countries could affect trade patterns and insights regarding
unilateral policies can be extended to such cases.
Further research could investigate the empirical relevance of this paper’s argument by assessing the
relationship between carbon leakage and the spatial distribution of innovation over time. It could also contribute to formalizing the discussion regarding the results’ sensitivity to modeling assumptions, as presented
in Section 5. Alternatively, the model could be extended by endogenizing the foreign country’s policy decision and its response to domestic policies. Finally, the size of the research bases in both countries is crucial,
yet taken fully exogenous. An interesting array of further research could be to endogenize the number of
scientists in a country, and determine how this endogenization affects optimal policy decisions.

Appendix
A

Proofs

To save on notation, all proofs use the following definitions for relative intermediates prices ptR ≡ pct /pdt ,
R ≡ L /L , and relative final goods
relative technology AtR ≡ Act /Adt , relative labor LwR ≡ Lh /L f and Lkt
kct
kdt

prices pRwt ≡ pht /p f t . Likewise, we define relative taxes τ̃ktR ≡ τ̃kct /τ̃kdt and τktR ≡ τkct /τkdt , relative global
intermediates production ỸtW R ≡ ỸctW /ỸdtW and demand YtW R ≡ YctW /YdtW , and relative expected profits ΠRkt ≡
Πkct /Πkdt . Finally, ptR,LF is defined as the laissez-faire equilibrium relative price, where (21) gives ptR,LF =
− 1−α
AtR 1+(ε−1)β .
23 WIPO (2012) shows that China, the US and Japan belong to the 5 most innovative countries (by patent, trademark and industrial
design counts) worldwide, where China is the fastest growing.
24 See New York Times (2012) and Bloomberg (2013).
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A.1

Proof to Lemma 3

W for ν < t and, absent of environmental policy, growth in Ỹ W is strictly positive,
As Et is increasing in Ỹdν
d

implementing a sustainable growth path (see Definition 1) requires curbing growth in global dirty intermediates production. The proof then proceeds in two steps. First we determine YdtW,MIN , which is defined as the
minimum equilibrium global dirty intermediates demand for given technologies. If, asymptotically, YdtW,MIN
grows, so must YdW and hence ỸdW . The next step is to determine under what conditions growth in YdtW,MIN
LF
is weakly negative. In the remainder of the proof, we define YkLF
jt and Ỹk jt as the country k laissez-faire

equilibrium demand and supply of intermediate j.
Lemma A1 YdtW,MIN = Y fLF
dt
Proof For given technologies, both foreign demand and supply of dirty intermediates are solely a function
of ptR . By (6), (16), (17), and τ̃ f jt = τ f jt = 1 for both j ∈ {c, d} foreign supply of dirty intermediates reads

Ỹ f dt =



ptR

1−ε

 1−α−β
  α
α 
1−α−β
 1−α − 1−α
1
α 1−α
σ
Adt L f 1−α
.
1 + ptR β AtR β
+1
ψ

Ỹ f dt is falling in ptR and any policy in home that reduces ptR increases foreign supply of dirty intermediates.
Next, using (4), (6), (11), (16) and (17) we have

Y f dt =



1−ε
ptR

 β
  α
 α−σ 
1−α−β
 1 R  1−α 1−α
α 1−α
σ
R β
1−α
β
+1
At
Adt L f
.
1 + pt
ψ

Here, one can show that whenever ptR > ptR,LF , Y f dt is increasing in ptR . Now take the following thought
experiment. Suppose home can freely set any ptR , and under the condition that ptR is an equilibrium, choose
LF
any level for Yh jt and Ỹh jt . If home sets ptR = ptR,LF , Ỹ f dt = Ỹ fLF
dt = Y f dt = Y f dt . Home can eliminate its
R,LF
R
domestic demand and supply of dirty intermediates, and ỸdtW = Ỹ fLF
,
dt . If instead, home sets pt < pt

we find Ỹ f dt > Ỹ fLF
dt and Ỹ f dt > Y f dt . Home can eliminate its domestic supply of dirty intermediates, but
for ptR > ptR,LF to be an equilibrium, it must demand dirty intermediates. Hence, we have ỸdtW > Ỹ fLF
dt for
LF
ptR > ptR,LF . Finally, if home sets ptR > ptR,LF , we find Ỹ f dt < Ỹ fLF
dt = Y f dt < Y f dt . Now, home can eliminate

its domestic demand for dirty intermediates, but for this to be an equilibrium, it must produce and export
LF
W
LF
a positive amount of dirty intermediates. Now ỸdtW = YdtW > Y fLF
dt = Ỹ f dt . So, Ỹdt is minimized at Ỹdt with

ptR = ptR,LF . Up to now, this was a mere thought experiment. However, home can in fact implement ỸdtW,MIN
by setting τ̃hdt = τhdt = ∞ with any τ̃hct , τhct < ∞. In this case, home will neither demand, nor supply dirty
intermediates. Since home only produces and consumes clean intermediates, no trade will take place, and
foreign intermediate and final goods producers will face the laissez-faire (autarky) price. 
By Lemma A1 and (23), minimum global dirty intermediates supply reads
YdtW,MIN

 1−β −ε(1−α−β ) ε(1−α) 1−α−β   α

σ
σ
σ
α 1−α
1+(ε−1)β
1+(ε−1)β
+ Adt
Adt1+(ε−1)β Lk 1−α
= Act
ψ
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By (7), A jt − A jt−1 ≥ 0 for both j with strict inequality for at least one j ∈ {c, d}. YdtW,MIN is always
increasing in Adt , increasing in Act if ε< (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β ), constant in Act if ε= (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β )
and falling in Act if ε > (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β ). If Act and Adt grow at equal rates (AtR is constant), YdtMIN
rises. So implementing a YdtW,MIN that is constant or falling over time requires ε ≥ (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β ) and
W
a growing AtR . By the following, home can only implement a growing AtR if it can implement sW
c > sd at
W
W
W
R
R
R
R
time t. If home cannot implement sW
ct > sdt , we have sct ≤ sdt , At−1 ≥ At . Whenever At−1 ≥ At , for given

policies, the incentive to innovate in the clean sector is either equal or reduced, which implies that home
W,MIN
W
R
will be unable to implement sW
grows
c > sd at any point in the future. As A is constant or falling, Ydt
W
over time, and home cannot implement a sustainable growth path. If however, home implements sW
ct > sdt ,
R < AR . With unchanged policies, the incentive to innovate in the clean sector is increased,
by (7), At−1
t
W
R
and home can implement sW
cν > sdν for any ν > t. A continues to rise and in finite time, all scientists

innovate in the clean sector. In the long run, YdtMIN falls (if ε> (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β )) or remains constant (if
ε= (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β )). In either case, Ē must be sufficiently high to ensure Et < Ē for all t. 

A.2

Proof to Proposition 2

By Lemma 1, home can only implement a sustainable growth path at time t if ε ≥ (1 − β ) / (1 − α − β ),
W
Ē is sufficiently high and it can implement sW
ct > sdt . By Assumption 1, absent of environmental policies,

s f ct = 0. So if s f > sh , home must redirect a sufficient number of foreign scientists to the clean sector to
 W −1
W
R
R γzsct +1
implement sW
≥1
ct > sdt . Home achieves this if it implements policies such that Π f t = L f t γzsW +1
dt

γzsW
ct +1
γzsW
dt +1

> 1, where we use (17) and (24). Hence we need LRft ≥ Zt > 1. Then by (16) we
α−1
α−1
β
β
. This is true if in equilibrium, for ptR = Zt AtR
, we
can rewrite this condition to ptR ≥ Zt AtR

or some Zt ≡

have world relative demand for clean greater or equal to relative supply, or YctW R ≥ ỸctW R . Now at ptR =
α−1
β
Zt AtR
, by (6), (16) and (18), we find
pRwt
(27)

ỸtW R =

−

α
1−α

1+Zt

(τ̃htR )
pRwt

−

α
1−α

1−β
β

LwR

 1−α−β
1−α

Xt + 1

+Zt

1+Zt

R
1−β (Lw )
−
R
β
1+Zt (τ̃ht )

1−α−β
1−α

AtR

1−α

Xt + 1

where


(28)

1 + Zt τ̃htR
Xt ≡ 
1 + Zt

1−α−β
− 1 − 1−α
− 1−β
β
β
1 + Zt τ̃htR
− α

τ̃hdt1−α ,
1 + Zt

and we know

(29)

pRwt

=

1−ε
τhdt

ptR

1−ε

τhtR

1−ε

ptR

1−ε

+1
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+1

1
! 1−ε

.

1−β

Zt

,

Using additionally (12) and (17) we have
τhtR
(30)

−ε

YtW R =
pRwt

β (1−ε) R σ
1−α−β
At
R 1−α
w
β (1−ε) R σ R −ε
1+Zt
At
τht
β (1−ε) R σ
α
1−α−β
1+Zt
At
− 1−α
R 1−α
t
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β (1−ε) R σ R −ε
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ε(1−α) −εβ
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AtR
Zt .
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X +1
(L )
( ) ( )

1+Zt

The question we adress is under what conditions it is feasible for home to implement YtW R ≥ ỸtW R for
α−1
β
ptR = Zt AtR
. Here, home has four policy choices: the levels of the two intermediate output taxes,
and the two intermediate input taxes. Regarding these policy choices, we first put forward the following
Lemma.
Lemma A2: To maximize YtW R − ỸtW R , home must set τhct = τ̃hdt = 1.
Proof: By (29), multiple levels of τhtR support a given pRwt . We use this property to show that to maximize
YtW R − ỸtW R , we never have τhtR > 1. First, as long as pRwt is given, ỸtW R is independent of output taxes τ jht ,
yet YtW R is falling in τhtR . Hence, for a given pRwt , to maximize YtW R − ỸtW R , one must minimize τhtR . However,
to maintain this pRwt , any reduction in τhtR requires both a reduction in τhct and an increase in τhdt .25 As we
require τh jt ≥ 1, τhtR > 1 implies τhct > 1 and a reduction in τhtR while maintaining pRwt is always feasible. If
τhtR ≤ 1 however, we may have τhct = 1 (which we will later see is indeed the case), and further reductions
in τhtR may not be feasible. Thus, we conclude that maximizing YtW R − ỸtW R implies τhtR ≤ 1.
Next by (28), multiple levels of τ̃htR support a given Xt . We use this property to show that to maximize
YtW R − ỸtW R , we never have τ̃htR > 1. First, for a given Xt , ỸtW R is falling in τ̃htR and YtW R is independent of Xt .
Hence, for a given X, to maximize YtW R − ỸtW R , one must maximize τ̃htR . However, to maintain a given Xt ,
any increase in τ̃htR requires a reduction in τ̃hdt . For τ̃htR ≤ 1, one can show that for given Xt , an increase in τ̃htR
requires an increase in τ̃hdt . Hence, one can always increase τ̃htR if τ̃htR ≤ 1. Hence, to maximize YtW R − ỸtW R ,
one will never set τ̃htR < 1. For τ̃htR > 1, the relationship between τ̃htR and τ̃hdt turns ambiguous, and one may
hit the restriction τ̃hdt ≥ 1.
We now have established that the combination of some τhtR ≤ 1 and τ̃htR ≥ 1 maximizes YtW R − ỸtW R .
Now, given τhtR , YtW R − ỸtW R is maximized by minimizing pRwt . Above, we found that for given τhtR , pRwt is
increasing in τhdt . Hence, the τhtR ≤ 1 we set must be set such that τhdt is minimized, which is the case if we
set τhct = 1. Additionally, given τ̃htR , YtW R − ỸtW R is maximized by maximizing X, where X is falling in τ̃hdt .
Hence, the τ̃htR ≥ 1 we set must be set such that τhdt is minimized, which is the case if we set τ̃hdt = 1. 
Next using τ̃hdt = τhct = 1, and (27) and (30), YtW R ≥ ỸtW R implies
−(1+(ε−1)β )

Zt
25 More

specifically we have

dτhct
dτhdt

ε−1 R ε
= − ptR
τht

26

≥ G,

with
− α
 1−α−β
− 1−β
σ
1+Zt
 1−α−β
τ̃hct β pRwt 1−α
LwR 1−α Xt + 1
(AtR )
R
1−β
1−α
−
Xt + 1
L
β (1−ε) R σ ε
β
−σ
1+Zt
1+Zt τ̃hct
(At ) τhdt w
AtR
.
σ
α
1−α−β
β
(1−ε)

R
α
1−α−β

−
1+Z
A
1+Z
−
( t)
R
t
1−α
R ) 1−α X + 1
t
R ) 1−α X + 1
(L
p
t
pRwt 1−α
(L
wt
w
1−β
t
σ
w
β (1−ε) R
−
ε
1+Zt
β
(At ) τhdt
1+Zt τ̃

− α
pRwt 1−α
G≡
ε
τhdt

β (1−ε)

1+Zt

hct

Then, using τ̃hct ≥ 1 and τhdt ≥ 1, we can show dG/dLwR < 0 and dG/dAtR < 0. As, for a given Zt ,
R > 0, this implies dG/dAR < 0. Hence, the greater L /L and the greater A
dAtR /dAt−1
ct−1 /Adt−1 , the more
f
h
t−1

likely home can implement equilibrium relative prices pct /pdt that exceed the level required to suffienctly
increase the production of clean intermediates in the foreign country, and thereby redirect foreign scientists
to the clean sector. 

A.3

Proof to Proposition 3

The myopic social planner chooses the paths of machine production, xk jit , labor allocation,
Lhct, and relativei
h
´1
1
R
intermediates prices, pt that maximize intertemporal utility Ukt subject to cht = L̃ +s̃ Yht − ψ ∑ j 0 xh jit di ,
h
h



(2), (3), and (6) for k = h, (10) and, by (3), Yh jt = IM jt ptR + Ỹh jt where IM jt (pt ) ≡ Ỹ f jt ptR −Y f jt ptR ,
while taking the path of technology as given. First, define λht =
of final output, and λh jt =

∂Yht
λht ∂Y
h jt

∂Uht ∂ ct
∂ ct ∂Yht

as the shadow value of one unit

as the shadow value of input j in final output production. Similarly, we

∂Uht ∂ Et+
∂ Et+ ∂ Ỹ W
dt

as the shadow value of emissions at time t. Here, we have λht , λh jt > 0 and λhEt < 0.
take λhEt =
The FOC with respect to Lhct implies that the social planner allocates labor according to
(λhdt + λhEt )

∂ Ỹhdt
∂ Ỹhct
= λhct
.
∂ Lhdt
∂ Lhct

The FOC with respect to ptR then gives that in the optimum

(31)

λhdt

∂ Ỹ f dt
∂ IMdt
∂ IMct
+ λhct
+ λhEt
= 0.
R
R
∂ pt
∂ pt
∂ ptR

In the market equilibrium, the final output producer equates the relative return to clean and dirty input use to
∂Yht /∂Yhct
R R
∂Yht /∂Yhct = pt τht (see (11)) Similarly, by labor mobility, the return to labor is equal across
λhct
−1 ∂ Ỹhdt
−1 ∂ Ỹhct
R R
sectors (see (15)): pdt τ̃hdt
∂ Lhdt = pct τ̃hct ∂ Lhct . This gives us that in the optimum, we must have pt τht = λhdt
−1
hct
and ptR τ̃htR
= λ λ+λ
. From here we derive the optimal tax wedge
hdt
hEt

its marginal cost:

−1
λhdt
> 1.
= τ̃htR τhtR
λhdt + λhEt
The environmental externality calls for a net tax on dirty intermediates output and/or input. The greater
the environmental externality, the more negative λhEt and hence the larger dirty taxes are called for. The
optimal use of policy tools depends on foreign’s response. By balanced trade, we have ptR IMct + IMdt = 0
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ct
dt
for any ptR , which implies IMct + ptR ∂∂IM
+ ∂∂IM
= 0. Using this in addition to the above results, allows us
pR
pR
t

t

to rewrite (31) to
τhtR

τ̃htR τhtR



−1 R
−1
τ̃ht − 1 +

IMct
∂ IMdt /∂ ptR


+

∂Y f dt /∂ ptR
= 0.
∂ IMdt /∂ ptR

From here, we can show that the social planner will never set ptR ≥ ptLF . From the definition of IMdt ,
∂Y

/∂ pR

and by ∂ Ỹ f dt /∂ ptR < 0 and ∂Y f dt /∂ ptR > 0 we know ∂ IMf dt /∂ ptR ∈ (−1, 0). Hence we know that in the
dt
t


−1  R 
IMct
R 1+
ct
τ̃ht − 1 + ∂ IMIM/∂
optimum τhtR τ̃htR τhtR − 1
<
1,
or
τ
> 1. For ptR ≥ ptLF , we
ht
pR
∂ IM /∂ pR
dt

dt

t

t

have IMct ≥ 0, which by ∂ IMdt /∂ ptR < 0 implies we require τhtR > 1. By Lemma 1, to set ptR ≥ ptLF ,
− ε
Tht = τhtR 1−β τ̃htR must be greater than or equal to unity. With τhtR > 1, this implies we need τ̃htR > 1.
However, this gives τ̃htR τhtR > 1 which contradicts the requirement on the optimal tax wedge. 
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